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ESSENCE- IDENTITY- LIBERATION: THREE WAYS OF LOOKING 
AT CHRISTIANITY* 
John May 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to think of 'Christianity' as a 
single, unitary phenomenon. The fact that Christianity embraces an 
endless variety of institutional, liturgical and doctrinal forms is not new; 
there is ample evidence for it in the New Testament. So the vague 
uncertainty about the existence of an underlying, unifying factor which 
would allow all these manifestations to be identified as 'Christian' must 
have something to do with the way we perceive Christianity. Latins 
and Greeks, Catholics and Protestants, and, more recently, 'North' and 
'South' have of course perceived what they took to be the Christian 
faith in radically different ways, though usually with the serene assurance 
that their particular confessional viewpoint was the only acceptable one. 
The success of the Ecumenical Movement and the advent of Religious 
Studies as a phenomenological discipline have made us aware, not only 
that Christians 'see' their common faith under different aspects, but that 
what we all agree to call 'Christianity' is almost impossible to describe 
adequately under any single aspect. The full extent of the problem 
becomes apparent when we reflect that, even for allegedly 'objective' 
scholarship, there is no 'neutral ground' above the fray from which all 
this teeming variety may be viewed 'as it really is'. Whoever we are, and 
from whatever level of abstraction we choose to view Christianity, we 
are always necessarily taking up one particular viewpoint rather than 
others, which we might have chosen had we been born in South Italy 
rather than North Germany, or had we studied at Chicago rather than 
Lancaster. The growing awareness that Christianity itself is only one 
manifestation among others of what some would prefer to call 'faith' 
and others 'religion' only exacerbates the problem. 
In short, we have become aware of the need to scrutinise more 
closely the interpretative schemes or frameworks with the help of which 
we inevitably look at Christianity, whether as believers or as scholars. 
I should like to discuss three such interpretative frameworks or 
methodological paradigms in the historical order in which they were 
proposed. Each of them, I believe, improves upon its predecessor, though 
without supplanting it entirely. I shall try to criticise the deficiencies 
of each whilst highlighting possible complementarities, in such a way 
that, cumulatively, the three concepts might provide at least the elements 
of an approach adequate both to the complex historical phenomenon 
of Christianity and to our present stage of reflection upon it. I shall 
begin by reviewing a debate about the 'essence' of Christianity which 
occupied historians at the turn of the century (1 ), and I shall then 
discuss an alternative proposal based on the social science concept of 
'identity' (2). I shall conclude by trying to assess the merits of a more 
recent approach which emphasises the concrete praxis of 'liberation' 
Religious Traditions 31 
(3). 
1. Essence 
In the winter of 1899-1900 the doyen of German historians of 
Christianity, Adolf von Harnack, held open lectures at the University 
of Berlin. His aim was to give a concentrated account of what is 
decisively important about the Christian faith in terms that could be 
understood by all serious seekers after truth in the educated world of 
the day. The lectures were able to be published that same year under 
the title Das Wesen des Christentums (Harnack, (1900) 1950). 
Harnack took up an explicitly historical position as distinct from 
a speculative, apologetic or theological one (1950: 4 f.); he was not 
interested in presenting the 'whole' of Christianity, but in laying bare 
its 'essentials' by the exlusive use of historical method (8 f.). Allowing 
for a few exceptions in the letters of Paul, he regarded the synoptic 
Gospels as the only trustworthy historical source for his purpose (12), 
which was to reconstruct the preaching of Jesus, the end of his life in 
the service of his calling, and the impression he made on his disciples 
(19). He devoted by far the greater part of his lectures to the first of 
these, the preaching, for it enabled him to isolate the essential content 
of 'the Gospel', and this gave him a criterion by which he could judge 
the subsequent vicissitudes of the new faith lived by Jesus and inspired 
in his followers in the course of its history. He was emphatic about the 
newness of this faith with respect to that of the Jews, in which he saw 
a stern monotheism distorted by ritual and casuistry (cf. 29). This 
conviction led him to see the fatherhood of God with its promise of 
divine sonship as the great contribution of Jesus to the religious life 
of mankind, and though he ranged it alongside the coming of God's 
kingdom and the superior justice of the command to love one's 
fellow-humans (31 ff.), it was this privilege of calling God one's father 
which for Harnack was the summit of all religion and the essential 
element setting the faith of Jesus apart from all the other faiths of 
mankind. For him, this was 'the Gospel' in all its purity and simplicity. 
It was only to be expected that, though Harnack was scrupulously fair 
in assessing the achievements and aberrations of each of the major 
historical forms in which the faith of Christians has been embodied, 
in the end the palm went to Protestantism. 
It was this circumstance, no doubt, at least in part, that prompted 
the French Catholic exegete and historian Alfred Loisy to publish a 
detailed criticism of Harnack's argument two years later, which under 
the title L'Evangile et l'Eglise ((1902), 1930) became one of the classics 
of Modernism and whose prohibition by Rome led to its author's leaving 
the church. When I said above that Harnack attempted to characterise, 
not 'faith in Jesus', but 'the faith of Jesus' as the 'essence' of Christianity, 
it was in anticipation of Loisy's criticism that Luther would have been 
profoundly dismayed by this elimination of a crucial element in saving 
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faith from his conception of 'the Gospel' (1930: xii). For Loisy, it is 
precisely the faith of the first Christian communities in Jesus as Son of 
God, as formulated in their preaching and writing, that constitutes 'the 
Gospel', so that 'Church' and 'Gospel' become mutually related and 
dependent categories (l37). Far from being an immutable essence (xxii) 
or an abstract Ideal (xxxiii) which could be isolated and used as a criterion 
with which to sit in judgement on the history of Christianity, the Gospel 
for Loisy was "a living belief (croyance), concrete and complex, whose 
evolution doubtlessly proceeds from the inner force which gave it 
consistency (l'a faite durable), but which was no less necessarily influenced 
in everything, and from the outset, by the milieu in which it came into 
being and grew" (69-70). He was able to identify the 'collective life' of 
the Church with the 'universal life' of the Gospel (l67); for him, the 
Church was "a real institution which continues the real Gospel" (215). 
There are some nice ironies here. The Catholic exegete takes the 
Protestant historian to task for basing his account of Christian faith on 
a too narrow selection of texts whose authenticity is doubtful (Ch. 1) 
and accuses him of being "a theologian who takes from history Vl'hatever 
suits his theology" (ix); and as a reward for his apologetic defence of the 
church he is placed on the Index of forbidden books. Loisy put his finger 
on one of the major weaknesses in Harnack's presentation, which at the 
time gave the illusion of being its strength: Harnack needed his abstract 
'Gospel', which was ultimately accessible only to the free individual (cf. 
1950: 164), in order to have an unassailable criterion for his judgement 
of Christian history - and as his criterion was Protestant, it is no wonder 
that his judgement turned out to favour Protestantism. This was 
acknowledged by one of the most important protestant participants in 
the debate, the historian and sociologist Ernst Troeltsch, writing in 1903 
(Troeltsch, 1922: 389). But instead of becoming bogged down in 
interconfessional polemics, Troeltsch set out to lay bare the 
methodological presuppositions of any attempt to describe the 'essence' 
of a religion. 
For Troeltsch, the whole point about an historical 'essence' is that 
it contains the seeds of future growth-in-continuity (cf. 420). Troeltsch 
could thus sum up his thesis in the pregnant phrase: "Wesensbestimmung 
ist Wesensgestaltung" ( 43 1 ), "To determine the essence is to shape it 
anew", just as the Reformers did in the 16th century. This is why he 
considered it illegitimate to reconstruct the 'essence' of Christianity 
from the initial period (414) or the preaching of Jesus (417) alone, 
without taking into account the community and its further development. 
It is impossible to extract this 'essence' from the Bible alone, for 
determing the essence involves "a synthesis of history and the future" 
(447). But the problem remains that of continuity: how does one remain 
assured of continuity while "shaping the continuum anew"? (432). As 
Troeltsch himself concedes, we are dealing with "the great general problem 
of the relationship of history and norms" ( 433-4 ). 
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Troeltsch achieved something of a synthesis between the positions of 
Harnack and Loisy, and in doing so he laid the foundations for tackling 
the problem of continuity-in-change in any religious tradition. To take 
but one example, Buddhists are conceivably faced with comparable 
difficulties in deciding whether the Theravada is merely atrophied or 
especially faithful to the teachings of the Enlightened One; whether 
the contentious prophetic figure of Nichiren is authentically Buddhist; 
whether Zen or the Tantra are not implicit denials of the dhamma, and 
so on. It is in fact on the basis of Troeltsch's work that the prospect 
has been opened up of a 'comparative hermeneutics' which would examine 
such problems in the contexts of various religious traditions (cf. Pye 
and Morgan, 1973). But Troeltsch's debt to Hegelianism and his residual 
loyalty to Protestant subjectivism prevented him from reaching a really 
satisfactory solution to the problem he was among the first to recognise: 
how do norms, with their claim to absolute validity, operate among the 
contingencies of history, and how is an 'essence' conceivable whose very 
nature is change? This failure is characteristic of his whole noble attempt 
to mediate between the passing age of abstract ideals and imperishable 
truths and the coming period of historical awareness and empirical analysis 
of society. 
For my own part, I do not see much point in continuing to won·y about 
the concept of 'essence' in the hope of teasing out some further aspect which 
will make it more adequate to the problems of continuity raised by the 
history of Christianity. To speak of essences', whether Hegelian or 
otherwise, in such a connection, let alone making them the chief object 
of one's study, is to come d.angerously close to reifying those 
methodological abstractions which we undeniably need if we are to 
discern patterns in the flux of history. But we must not confuse the 
methodological tools we are using with the historical materials on which 
we are working. 
l believe a more fruitful line of enquiry can be opened up by 
scrutinising more closely the very notion of 'Christia.nity ' as one religious 
entity among other uch which we usually distinguish to our satisfaction 
by labelling each with some particular 'ism' of oru own making. Almost 
twenty years ago, the distinguished Canadian religionist Wil fred Cantwell 
Smith made the intriguing suggestion, passed over somewhat 
condescendingly by many of his colleagues, that the idea we so easily 
take for granted - that there are such things as 'religions' - is itself the 
product of a very specific historical development (Smith, (1962) 1978). 
It was only after the Refonnation and its obsession with confessional 
boundaries and the Enlightenment with its penchan t for abstract, 
impersonal thinking that religio Christiana came to designate the religious 
institution to which one belonged (39 ff.), and only in the 18th century 
did the term 'Christianity' come into general use (76- 77). 
In between, however, came an event of enormous importance which 
was largely instrumental in precipitating this change in the Christian 
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mentality, but which historians of Christianity have generally succeeded 
in repressing, thus effectively excluding it from their field of vision. I 
refer to the advent of Islam like a sudden storm fTom the Arabian desert. 
In order to explain this 'special case', as he calls it {Ch. 4), Smith draws 
our attention to what may fairly be described as the first situation of 
explicit religious plurali m in history, which emerged in the Middle East 
in the wake of Hellenistic cultu.re and Christian proselytism in their 
interaction with Oriental cults and Persian dualism (19). In this confused 
and unsettled milieu there emerged the first person in history to 
deliberately and consciously 'found a religion', complete with holy 
scripture: the would-be prophet Mani. His monumental achievement 
places him on a quite different - and considerably lower - level from 
the Buddha, Moses or Jesus (95 ff.) , but it prepares the ground for 
Muhammad, who 'founded' Islam and recorded' its holy book in a sense 
quite new in the history of religion. Yet even here, in a way quite 
analogous to the case of 'Christianity', it is submission to Allah (isTam) as 
one's personal religion (din) which characterises the early writings; only 
in the classical and medieval periods does the term 'Islam' as the 
designation of 'the religion of Muslims' draw alongside 'faith' (iman) 
as an accepted term, and it is not till the 19th century that it gains the 
ascendancy as "a direct consequence of apologetics" (115), i.e. after 
contact with Western influence and scholarship. (cf. 116). 
Islam, then, was born with an unusually developed awareness of 
itself as 'a religion' with internal coherence and an international mission 
of which politics and war were integral parts. Its almost immediate and 
totally unexpected invasion of both Europe and India, almost 
successful in the former case and largely successful in the latter, started 
the long processes of internal evolution which eventually brought 
'Christianity' and 'Hinduism' into general awareness as religious systems 
clearly distinguished from one another and from all others in the minds 
of those who adhered to them. 
By now it should be apparent that there are problems involved in 
regarding 'Christianity' as a unitary phenomenon with an 'essence' that 
can be identified independently of all particular historical situations 
and cultural contexts. Even our habit of speaking about Christianity as 
'a religion' among other such has been called into doubt. I believe these 
difficulties can be mitigated , however, if we try a different approach. 
2. Identity 
The simplest way to understand what is meant by 'identity' is to 
ask oneself, 'Who am I?' Most of us are able to answer this question 
by mentioning our names and telling stories about where we come from, 
who our parents were, and what we have done with out lives up till now. 
In the form of narrative, we establish continuity in time and strengthen 
our conviction that we are 'identical with ourselves' (the original meaning 
of the term in the philosophy of German idealism). Others, however, 
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such as orphans, refugees and those suffering from amnesia, are unable 
to do tlli , and their plight introduces us to the com plex problems 
derlying this simple concept. The achievement o f personal identity -
under the confusing conditions of contemporary pluralism it is often 
a hard-won achievement - represents a precarious victory in the struggle :o reconcile the conflicting claims of stability and change; to find a 
balance between secure possession of what we value and 'live by' and the 
need to adapt to changing circumstances. My thesis in what follows will 
be that societies and their institutions are caught up in a comparable 
process (cf. Mol , 1976: 55 - 65). 
Every time we address another human being whom we take to be a 
conscious subject like ourselves, in possession of his or her faculties, we 
make two basic assumptions. The first is that we are in the presence 
of an autonomous centre from which acts of initiative and com-
munication originate independently of environmental or other 
observable influences. At the same time, we assume that we would 
have no access to this centre of the personality were it not mediated to 
us by a complex, socially constructed pattern of behaviour, a social 
medium througll which alone the person becomes available to us for 
purposes of communication. George Herbert Mead (1934) dubbed these 
two components of personal identity the 'I' and the 'me' (173-178). 
Neither can be meaningfully conceived without the other; their action 
upon one another is reciprocal; and only together do they make up the 
'self' which, thou gil constituted by society, yet acts autonomously upon 
the society which constitutes it. 
Of course we must be extremely careful in transposing this conception 
of identity from social psychology to the sphere of religious history. Yet 
as long as we remain aware that we are dealing, not with objects of 
historical enquiry, but with methodological tools, the same caution which 
caused us to reject the notion of 'essence' migllt well incline us to accept 
that of 'identity' if it serves our purpose. For myself, I am convinced 
that a re-conception of Christian history in terms of a search for identity 
is worth the attempt, a position I shall defend presently. 
When Troeltsch went to the length of suggesting that "The essence 
of Christianity contains in itself a polarity and its formulation must be 
dualist" (1922: 421-2) and concluded that "one only possesses the 
essence in the connection (Zusammenhang, between the initial period and 
the subsequent development, J.M.), and in this connection the preaching 
of Jesus is the stronger (factor)'' ( 423), his thought can fairly be 
interpreted as referring to what I have called the 'autonomous centre' -
Jesus and his teaching - and its 'social medium' - the community's 
response to Jesus and its transmission of his teaching. There is indeed a 
sense in which 'the Gospel' as our abstract expression of this centre 
must be given priority over the medium of its transmission, yet Loisy 
was surely rigllt in insisting on the mutual complementarity of Church 
and Gospel in this process, while acknowledging that "What constitutes 
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the identity of the church or of man is not the permanent immobility 
of external forms, but the continuity of existence and of the 
consciousness of being beneath the perpetual transformations which 
are the condition and the manifestation oflife" (1930: 158-9). 
It is difficult to test the explanatory power of an hypothesis as 
general as the one I am proposing, especially when it is almost entirely 
methodological in scope, but in what follows I would like to give some 
indications of the difference the concept of 'identity', as a relationship 
between 'autonomous centre' and 'social medium' might make to the 
way we study the history of Christianity. In the personal sphere, identity 
can only be attained through interaction with others (with reference to 
this, Mead spoke of society as the 'generalised other', 1934: 154). If our 
thesis holds good, the same should also be true of 'Christianity' as a 
socio-cultural phenomenon. The possibility of verifying this is often 
obscured by the fact that historians of Christianity tend to treat their 
subject as an exclusively European development largely independent of 
outside influences. Yet the formation of what we know as 'Medieval 
Christendom', for instance, can be more adequately explained as an 
interaction of Jewish, Muslim and Christian forces ( cf. Pirenne, 1941: 
141 ff.). 
Just as it is the encounter with the other, first in the protective 
family circle, but later - and crucially - in the strange world outside 
with its surprises and challenges, that allows personality to develop to 
the stage where it is in secure possession of an unmistakeable 'identity', 
so in the history of religions it is not only continuity with one's origins, 
but equally encounter, interaction and dialogue with alternative ways 
of believing that allow faith to reach full maturity. I cannot even say 
'You are different from me; your culture, your faith are strangers to 
mine' without implying that there is indeed such a thing as my specific 
and inalienable religious identity. The 'autonomous centre' of my faith 
is usually given to me in the earliest, pre-reflective stages of 
socialisation, but I can only discover its full scope by subjecting it, 
consciously and continuously, to such encounters with what is alien 
to it; and exactly the same applies to the community to which I belong 
with its collective identity. It is by committing myself to this, indeed, 
that I maintain my individual identity, both personal and religious. 
Perhaps Wilfred Cantwell Smith's attempt to mediate between 'faith' 
and 'cumulative tradition' in the history of religion (in the singular!) 
comes closest to what I am trying to say (cf. Smith, 1978: 156 ff.). Yet 
his insistence on discovering what looks like theistic faith in any and 
every religious tradition as a quality prior to and consitutive of humanity 
itself possibly prejudices the issue by making 'cumulative tradition' and 
its system of 'beliefs' an arbitrary and inessential adjunct of a sort of 
realised transcendence (this position is spelled out more clearly in Smith, 
1979). A social science approach to religion, by contrast, would insist with 
Niklas Luhmann (1977) that the social genesis of 'meaning' is the 
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supposition of religious en ibilily, and with Hans Mol (1976) that 
pre · · · t ' al " ' th "d ti.t. d b U e preci e function of rellgwn 1s o sacr 1se e 1 en tes generate y 
social process, thu making to integral 
t the continuity of society and tts mst1tut10ns. My destgnatwn of the 
aspects of Christianity as the 'social medium' of an 
utonomous centre', which for Christians is and remains the figure of 
!esus and the Gospel teaching, an. attempt to retain what is valuable 
in both the historical and the approaches. . 
Christian identity, as the fragile result of contmual search and 
struggle, was not the later produc( of some unforeseen aberration of 
Christian history, but was at issue in the life of the Christian community 
from the very beginning. If Rosemary Ruether's analysis of the conflict 
of the first Christians with their Jewish co-religionists is corect, 
specifically Christian faith in Jesus was born in a crisis of Jewish identity 
(cf. Ruether, 1979). We must not imagine that 'the Gospel' existed 
initially in some sort of pure state, only later to be subjected to the 
stresses and stains of history and the vagaries of interpretation. The 
gospels show us clearly enough that Jesus himself had to struggle to 
achieve his identity as Son of Man and messianic saviour of his people, 
and for his first followers, disparate groups loosely allied as a Jewish 
sect in a Hellenistic environment, the struggle was in sense even more 
difficult. Historians of Christianity, often more preoccupied with 
theology than with historical explanation, do not always make this clear 
to us. It is thus peculiarly gratifying to find a theologian as eminent 
as Edward Schillebeeckx, in his monumental study of Jesus, unconsci-
ously echoing Loisy when he identifies the "constant unitive factor" 
holding together the diverse manifestations of earliest Christian faith 
as being simply "the Christian movement itself" (Schillebeeckx, 
1979: 56). And, if we repudiate what Cantwell Smith calls the "big-bang 
theory" of religious origins, "the notion that a religion begins with one 
great seismic event" (Smith, 1981: 15 5), we realise that the Christian 
movement is still in motion, though it has grown incomparably more 
complex in the course of time and interaction with a variety of cultures 
and is still mediating to us the many facets of the central reality at the 
core of faith. An increasing number of Christians today, however, are 
impatient with this pretended solution to the problem of how we look 
at Christianity; indeed, they would dispute the importance of the very 
question of Christian 'identity'. In conclusion, I shall try to do justice to 
their objections. 
3. Liberation 
Hugo Assmann throws down his challenge to the whole elaborate 
enterprise of biblical henneneutics, the art of interpreting classical texts 
in the medium of tradition, with the tet-se statement: "The original 'text' 
has become our reality and our practice" (Assmann, 1976: 104). For the 
man who proposed suspending communication with the West and its 
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policies - and theologie - of dominance, there is no time to be lost 
trying to discern the 'specificalJy Christian ' contribution to revolution 
and to devise a politicaJ 'third way to p·revent contamination by 
compellng ideologies. "In the Bible, no message is vaJid unless it is 'made 
true' in practice" (Assmann, 1976: 64), and ' 'faith must be understood 
as basically its practice" (80). Disillusionment with 'development' in the 
interests of the West has led to the demand for 'liberation', and " che 
personaJ experience of belonging to dominated nations has produced 
the theology of liberation" (52). Though by no means alJ Latin 
American Christians share Assmann 's more radicaJ views, bascialJy he is 
merely putting into sharp focus a broad movement at alJ levels of church 
life there. 
In Asia , many Christians are also talking about the 'practice of 
liberation ' , though often they mean the spiritual practice of transcendent 
liberation as taught by Buddhism and Hinduism. Kadowaki (1979) uses 
Zen koans in the light of meditative experience to point up the 
immediately J?ractical significance of Gospel sayings whose meaning we 
thought we understood , and Panikkar (1978) maintains that he who 
would 'translate' Hindu spirituality and doctrine to his fellow-Christians 
"has to be, to a certain extent ... converted to the tradition from which 
he is to participate fully in "the intra-religious dialogue" (Panikkar, 1978 : 
xxvi; cf. 27) . The Latin American and Asian attempts to create 
'contextual' theologies in their very different cultural settings take very 
little notice of one another, the exception being those theologians like 
Sebastian Kappen in India and Aloysius Pieris in Sir Lanka who participate 
in the activities of the Ecumenical Association of Third World 
Theologians (EATWOT). Yet they have in common a strong emphasis 
on practice, whether piritual or political, and a tendency to regard the 
preservation of Christian - let alone confessional - ' identity' as second ary 
to the achievement of 'liberation' in an its dimensions, however it be 
motivated and symbolised, indeed, one is tempted at times to speak of a 
liberation from identity. 
Even in Western scholarship there is discemable what I shall call for 
the sake of brevity a search for the Jewish Jesus, evident in attempts to 
reconstruct the social history of the eaJJiest 'Jesus movement' (Theij3en, 
1977; cf. Schottroff and Stegemann, 1978) and to determine the 
theological significance of Jesus' Jewishness (Ruether, 1979). Parallel 
to this, however, there is what I shall call with similar license a search for 
the Gnostic Christ, stimulated by the new interest of theologians in 
Gnosticism (Pagels, 1979). There is also a disturbing analogy between 
the original Christian encounter with Gnosticism and the contemporary 
challenge to Christian faith from Indian religion. In the long view of 
history, the church of the ecumenical councils and the medieval papacy 
carried the day; but many are asking at what spiritual cost Christian 
'identity' was thus preserved. 
Once again, each of the tendencies I have tried to pinpoint, despite 
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. 'd Jy differing focus on the 'Jewish Jesus' and the 'Gnostic Christ' , thetr wt e d b ,. d . t ' ("f h . . k values 'liberation', however , a 1 enltt1 . y. 1, t tShlS tah. en 
the preservation of t e spec1 1c y nst1an rat cr t an to mean ) If a1 · · 11 'f' d' oneself in the individual sense . my an ys1s IS at a correct, 
m. number of influential Christians feel tltat Christian identity, 
an mer · h d · d · t't · f ' ff' 'al' at least as this is enshrined m t e octnnes an ms 1 utwns o o ICI 
Christianity, can and should be put at risk for the sake of the greater 
good of living the faith in the situaud·onhs of 
1
the 
temporary world, so that theologians are commg to regar t emse ves 
con mere spokesmen and -women for the 'popular' Christianity of 'basic 
as h h 'b . . communities' (cf. Metz, 1980, w o compares t e as1c commumty 
church' of today with the traditional 'religious order church'). This 
movement, of course, if such it is, is fraught with ambiguities: who are 
'the people', soberly scrutinised? And in what precisely would their 
'liberation' consist? The more thoughtful protagonists of liberation 
theology, such as Segundo (1976: 183-240), are well aware of these 
ambiguities. 
Now that the age-old attempt to define the 'essence' of 
Christianity once and for all and independently of historical circumstances 
has been shown to be futile in the face of social conditioning and cultural 
interaction, we seem to be left with the tension between 'identity' and 
'liberation', or (in the terms of a debate between Gadamer, 1971, and 
Habermas, 1971; cf. Tracy, 1981: 73 ff., for its transposition to the 
theological arena) 'hermeneutics' and 'praxis', as the most satisfactory 
way of looking at Christianity today. Our use of words such as 'essential' 
or 'central' still betrays our need to speak as if some timeless essence of 
Christianity were available to us, but despite the pretentions of both 
Hegelian and Nco-Scholastic theologies we now realise that it is as 
inaccessible to us as the 'I' of personality without the meditation of 
the socially determined 'me'. Thus do Panikkar and Cantwell Smith 
distinguish between personal 'faith' and the intellectual 'beliefs' that 
express it in different cultures, and Segundo, well aware that ideology 
is the prerequisite of revolutionary commitment, goes so far as to say 
that faith without ideology is dead (cf. Segundo, 1976: 97- 124). The 
practice of liberation, it would seem, at least for a broad spectrum of 
contemporary Christian , is the only link between the cutting edge of 
experience to motive force of a genuinely Christian self-understanding. 
Each reinforces the other, and always with reference to a very specific 
local situation. By contrast, those at present engaged in engineering 
'global theologies' (can it be y chance that they are all to be found in 
the universities of the 'North' ?) will have to face the questioJ1 whose 
theology this could conceivably be ; whose religion, psychologica.lly and 
sociologically, is •universal religion'? 
Dr John May 
Melanesian Council of Churches, P.N.G. 
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